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MINNESOTA v. DICKERSON
113 S.Ct. 2130 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Timothy Dickerson was convicted of possession
of a controlled substance in the fifth degree.' He
challenged the admission of the crack cocaine seized
by the police officers on the grounds that the search
violated the Fourth Amendment.
On November 9, 1989, two police officers in
Minneapolis were patrolling the north side of the
city in a marked squad car. During that evening, one
of the officers observed Timothy Dickerson leaving
a building considered to be a notorious "crack house."
In fact, one of the officers, Vernon Rose, had previ-
ously responded to complaints of drug sales in the
building. Rose saw Dickerson leaving the apartment
building and heading in the direction of the police
car. Dickerson made eye contact with Rose, and then
Dickerson abruptly turned around and began walk-
ing toward a side alley on the other side of the apart-
ment building. This action raised the officers' suspi-
cion, and they decided to investigate further.
The officers drove their squad car into the al-
ley, and ordered Dickerson to stop and submit to a
patdown search. Dickerson did not make any eva-
sive movements or efforts to conceal. The pat search
revealed no weapons, but Officer Rose did feel a
small lump in the front pocket of Dickerson's nylon
jacket. Rose examined the lump with his fingers.
Based upon his experience, he knew the lump was
crack cocaine in cellophane wrap. The officer then
reached into the pocket and pulled out a small plas-
tic bag containing one fifth of one gram of crack
cocaine. Dickerson was then arrested and charged
with possession of a controlled substance.
I At the time of Dickerson's arrest and conviction,
Minnesota statute § 152.025 provided in part that "[a]
person is guilty of controlled substance crime in the fifth
degree if the person unlawfully possesses one or more
mixtures containing a controlled substance ... except a
small amount of marijuana."
2 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (finding a valid search under the
Fourth Amendment when an officer "observes unusual
conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot...
he is entitled ... to conduct a carefully limited search of
outer clothing of such person in an attempt to discover
Dickerson moved pretrial to suppress the co-
caine, but the trial court held that the officers were
justified in stopping Dickerson under Terry v. Ohio
to see whether he was engaged in criminal activity
and could search him to ensure that he was not car-
rying a weapon.2 By analogizing the Terry exception
to the "plain view" doctrine, the trial court found
that the search did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.
The trial court reasoned that since an officer is
permitted to make a warrantless seizure of contra-
band found in plain view, the Fourth Amendment
would not be violated by the seizure of contraband
that the officer can easily feel when frisking a sus-
pect. After the denial of the suppression motion,
Dickerson was found guilty at trial.
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
reversed. The court agreed that the investigative stop
and patdown search were lawful under Terry because
there were specific facts that indicated that
Dickerson might be engaged in criminal behavior
and that he might be armed and dangerous. How-
ever, the court of appeals explicitly refused to adopt
a "plain feel" exception to the requirement that,
except in very limited circumstances, a police search
requires that a warrant be obtained.
3
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. The'
court held that both the stop and the patdown were
permissible without a warrant, but the seizure of
the cocaine was not. The court refused to extend
the "plain view" doctrine to the "plain feel" doctrine
because "the sense of touch is inherently less imme-
diate and less reliable than the sense of sight."4 A
"plain feel" doctrine would be far more intrusive into
weapons which might be used to assault him."). This search
is to be limited to what is necessary for the discovery of
weapons; it is to allow the officer to continue in the in-
vestigation of possible criminal activity without fear of
violence. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2136. If the search goes
beyond these bounds it is no longer valid and its fruits
will be suppressed. Id. If a legitimate Terry search turns
up contraband it is admissible as evidence. Id.
3 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462, 466
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
4 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d. 840, 845
(Minn. 1992).
the personal privacy that is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment.5 The Minnesota court also decided that
the search went far beyond what was authorized
because the officer determined that the lump in the
jacket was contraband only after probing and inves-
tigating what was dearly not a weapon. His search,
therefore, went beyond ascertaining whether
Dickerson was armed. The state petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari, which
was granted. 6
HOLDING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Minnesota Supreme Court.7 The Court found
the case similar to Arizona v. Hicks s where seizure
of stolen stereo equipment was held invalid because
the officers did not know the equipment was stolen
until they moved the equipment to read the serial
numbers.9 In the present case, although the officers
could search Dickerson for weapons, the seizure of
the crack cocaine was improper because the incrimi-
nating character of the object was not immediately
apparent to the officer. 0 The officer who felt the
cellophane-wrapped object could not have deter-
mined it was contraband until he conducted a fur-
ther search, unauthorized under Terry. 1 Because
further search of the jacket pocket was constitution-
ally impermissible, the seizure of the cocaine from
that pocket was also unconstitutional. 2 Therefore,




6 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. 53 (1992).
7 Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2130.
8 420 U.S. 321 (1987).





"4 Id. at 2135 (quoting Thompson v. Louisiana, 469
U.S. 17 (1984) (per curiam) (holding that although the
homicide investigators may have had probable cause to
search the premises, for the search to be valid, it must fall
within one of the narrow and specifically delineated ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment)).
,s See supra note 2.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
Writing for the Court, Justice White reaffirmed
the principle that searches and seizures conducted
without prior approval of a judge or magistrate are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
"subject only to a few specific and well delineated
exceptions."' Teny created one such exception.'s
The Court determined that the seizure of evidence
discovered during a legitimate Terry search was
analogous to the seizure of evidence permissible
under the "plain view" doctrine.' 6
According to Justice White, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court's rejection of the "plain view" analogy
was wrong.'7 The premise of the Terry decision it-
self was that the sense of touch may reveal the na-
ture of an object with sufficient reliability to justify
a seizure.'8 It is precisely the inference of Terry that
the officers will be able to determine the presence
of weapons by the sense of touch; the seizure of
weapons thus found is clearly permitted by Terry.19
The sense of touch is less reliable than vision,
but that does not mean that it is never correct. An
officer making a search based on either vision or
touch must have probable cause to justify the search.
Probable cause may be more difficult to show in
the latter case, but the Fourth Amendment imposes
this requirement to ensure against grossly specula-
tive seizures.20
The Court held that the second concern of the
Minnesota Supreme Court, that touch is more in-
trusive than sight, was invalid because the search
for weapons by sense of touch has been authorized
by Terry.2' There is no additional loss of privacy from
a "plain feel" contraband seizure in the course of a
Terny search for weapons.?
6 Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2137. The rationale behind
the "plain view" doctrine is that discovery of an object in
plain view is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The rule is the same for tactile discoveries.
If an officer pats down a suspect's clothing and feels a
bulge and immediately recognizes the unlawful nature of
the object, then there has been no invasion of the suspect's
privacy interest beyond the legitimate Terry search for
weapons. But if the officer lacks probable cause to be-
lieve that the object is contraband without conducting a







22 Id. at 2138.
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court
agreed that the officers were acting lawfully when
they stopped and frisked Dickerson. In fact, these
two issues were not challenged by Dickerson. 24 The
dispositive question for the Court was whether the
officer was acting constitutionally in continuing the
contraband search after ascertaining that Dickerson
was unarmed.25 According to his trial testimony, the
officer could not immediately ascertain that the
object was crack cocaine, but rather engaged in
"squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the
contents of the defendant's pocket," after determin-
ing that the pocket did not contain a weapon.
26
The Court held that the officer dearly over-
stepped the bounds of the narrow search for weap-
ons allowed under Terry.27 The sole justification for
a search authorized by Teny is the protection of the
officers and bystanders. Where an officer is conduct-
ing a valid search for one item and seizes a differ-
ent item, the Court "has been sensitive to the
danger . . .that officers will enlarge a specific
authorization, furnished by a warrant or an exi-
gency, into the equivalent of a general warrant to
rummage and seize at will." Here, once the officer
concluded that Dickerson was unarmed, his further
search of the contents of Dickerson's jacket pocket
was unrelated to the Terry exception.29 Since the
further search of Dickerson's pocket to determine
that Dickerson was carrying crack cocaine was not
constitutionally valid, the seizure of the crack co-
caine found there was constitutionally impermis-
sible_
3°
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia ques-
tioned the holding in Terny. According to Scalia, one
can seek the meaning of Fourth Amendment guar-
antees in contemporaneous common law practices.
Scalia conceded that common law precedent per-
mits stops on suspicion, but pointed out that there
is no "precedent on physical search of a person thus
temporarily detained."3' 1 However, while the deci-
sion in Teny is not based on precedent, Scalia stated






28 Id. See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 748
(1983) (Stevens, J. concurring).
19 Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2139.
30 Id. at 2139.
31 Id. at 2140.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice
Blackmun and Justice Thomas, agreed with the
Court in its explication of the principles of a "plain
feel" exception. They did not however concur in the
Court's application of those principles to the facts
of Dickerson. The trial court's findings were not pre-
cise as to the officer's probable cause to believe that
the object contained in the pocket was contraband.
33
According to the dissenters, the case should have
been remanded so that the trial court could make a
precise finding on this issue.34
After Dickerson, it is clear that once police of-
ficers determine that a suspect is not carrying a
weapon, the police are not authorized to search any
further. However, if the police, while searching for
weapons, detect an object which they immediately
recognize as being contraband, this object can law-
fully be seized. In this regard, Dickerson seems to
logically follow the Court's decision in Teny because
it ensures that police searches are made for a spe-
cific purpose and are not used as a general warrant
to seize any contraband that is found.
Although this case may seem to be fair and just
at first reading, one must look at its ramifications to
determine if the Court did in fact reach a just re-
sult. The Court's holding in Dickerson has been in-
terpreted by some lower courts to mean that loca-
tion plus evasion equals reasonable suspicion for a
stop.3 5 Courts also usually allow a frisk following a
Terry stop when the crime involves drugs, even when
there is no indication that the suspect is armed.36
The implications of these results have a sub-
stantial impact on minorities. Since "zones of high"
crime activity"-- including drug activity -"are con-
centrated in inner city neighborhoods," a dispropor-
tionate number of blacks and Latinos are stopped.
These stops frequently include those without justi-
fication, since a large proportion of the population
of inner cities consists of blacks and Latinos?7 If, as
in Dickerson, mere presence in a crime area can help
create a reasonable suspicion, then minorities will
suffer because a large number of minorities work
and live in inner cities, where most crime occurs.
32 Id. at 2141.
3 Id.
3 Id.
3- See Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When
Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 Ind. LJ.
659, 674-675 (1994).
36 Id. at 676.
37 Id. at 677.
This does not seem to be a fair result since it is by
virtue of "their relative socioeconomic status" that
minorities find themselves living in crime prone
neighborhoods.
38
Another factor that some lower courts have used
to justify a stop and frisk is evasion from the police.
It is thought that if people run from the police then
there must be something to hide; that is not always
the case. Police are more likely to stop minorities
than they are non-minorities, 39 and thus it appears
that minorities have more reason to avoid police even
if they are not engaging in any illegal behavior. Since
minorities are more likely to be stopped by the po-
lice, they will comprise a disproportionate number
of people subjected to searches authorized by
Dickerson.
3B Id. at 678.
39 Id. at 679.
40 Terry, 392 U.S. at 38.
CONCLUSION
In his dissent to the Terry opinion, Justice Dou-
glas said, "to give the police greater power than a
magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitar-
ian path."' Justice Douglas thought that this would
lead to greater infringements of the Fourth Amend-
ment guarantees. Dickerson, as applied by the lower
courts, appears to be yet another step down that
path, and there may be others steps to come which
further erode the Fourth Amendment. Dickerson
may lead to further routine invasions of privacy, and
minorities have the most to fear from this since they
are the most likely to be stopped and frisked. Per-
haps the Court would do well to heed the words of
Benjamin Franklin who said, "those who would sac-
rifice liberty for a little security deserve neither lib-
erty nor security."
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